The article traces in the book of Genesis (1) theoretical and (2) methodic elements of an institutional economics: (1a) the idea of capital contribution-distribution interactions as model of social exchange; (1b) the idea of incentive structures as model of an institutional regulative for social exchange; (1c) the practical-normative goal of pareto-superiority (mutuality of gains) as desired interaction outcome; (2a) the methodic concept of conflicting and common interests in contribution-distribution interactions (the idea of a dilemma structure, or "war of all", as Hobbes called it); and (2b) the methodic concept of selfinterested choice behaviour (the homo economicus, or "methodological individualism" as Hayek referred to it). On these grounds, Genesis is deciphered and reconstructed in institutional economic terms. The article develops and explores the hypotheses (i) that the stories of Genesis reflect an intense interest and attempt to come to terms with the institutional problem of how to ensure cooperation in social interactions, and (ii) that the stories of Genesis address the institutional problem in economic terms, examining social conflict as capital contribution-distribution interactions, advising on the pareto-effectiveness of conflict resolution in relation to incentive structures, and methodically grounding analysis in the ideas of the dilemma structure and the homo economicus. Such an economic reconstruction of Genesis questions conventional theological suggestions on the role and extent to which the Bible invokes metaphysical concepts and metaphysical intervention for analyzing and solving social problems.
analyses of Bible stories, such as a game theoretical analysis ), a scarcity-based interpretation (Gordon 1994 , also Paris 1998 , and a legal-economic analysis of Bible stories (Miller 1994 (Miller , 1993a (Miller , 1993b . These studies touched upon issues which could be viewed as methodic and/or theoretical fragments of an institutional economic reconstruction of Bible stories as outlined by this article. They provide valuable source material and reference points to indicate the different type of economic analysis of Bible stories is pursued by the present paper and what different insights can thus be generated. It is suggested that an institutional economic reconstruction can accommodate and put into perspective Gordon's (1994 Gordon's ( , 1989 hypothesis that the Bible analyzed the problem of scarcity in human choice behaviour; hypothesis that biblical characters, including God, were rational economic game players; or Miller's (1994 Miller's ( , 1993a Miller's ( , 1993b hypotheses that the Bible analyzed economic aspects of animal sacrifices and of practices of oral contracting.
The article makes cautious claims that an institutional economic reconstruction gets closer to holding a "magic key" 3 to some of the mysteries of the Bible, at least more so than theological studies and previous economic studies. The present paper differs in various respects from previous economic studies of the Bible, namely in its specific research focus and its vision and understanding of the economic approach, including the demarcation of economics from theology 4 :
(i) Social problems depicted in Bible stories are coherently reconstructed by the present paper in scientific economic terms: as a reflection of the institutional problem understood as a capital contribution-distribution conflict which is induced by 'defective' incentive structures. Thus, social problems are reconstructed as a situational condition but not as a reflection of the human condition. Related, the present paper exits from a behavioural, theologically grounded economics, as explicitly subscribed to by Brams, Gordon, and Paris.
(ii) Game theory and rational choice theory, e.g. the ideas of the dilemma structure or the homo economicus, are only methodically aligned with Bible stories but not in a theoretical and/or empirical-behaviourial sense. The latter is explicitly done by Brams and Paris, and implicitly by Miller and Gordon. (iii) In practical-normative perspective, a resolution of social conflict is reconstructed by the present paper with regard to the idea of mutuality of gains ('pareto-superiority') as desired interaction outcome -the "wealth of a community of nations", as Genesis (35: 11, 48: 4, 19) referred to it. Previous economic studies of the Bible did not analyze this issue. Such a cooperation principle and further principles derived hereof are not too far away from religious ideals of sharing, solidarity, and social justice, although an institutional economics in the rational scientific tradition of the Enlightenment obviously would here proceed conceptually rather differently than theology or a theologically grounded economics.
(iv) A theologically grounded economics conceptualizes God as a metaphysical entity:
an omnipresent and omnipotent personal God, who intervened with the resolution of the institutional problem. In contrast, an economics of the Bible, as pursued in this article, ultimately deciphers and reconstructs the idea of God (as far as it relates to issues of social ordering) in rational scientific terms; as a reference of the Bible to an economic principle of ensuring public good in social interactions 5 .
This latter issue of how to conceptualise the idea of God in an economic analysis of Bible stories leads to possibly contentious but, for an economics, of religion important methodic and theoretical questions. In an economics of religion, the idea "God" may have to be differently approached than by a theologically grounded economics, which ontologically interpreted "God" as a given, metaphysical entity, and related the stories of the Bible as a "religious, holy reality", as done by Brams (1980: 3-5, 169-170, 173) , Gordon (1994 Gordon ( : 22, 39, also 1989 and Paris (1998: 42) , and by theology in general (See Tullock 1981 :2, Spriggs 1972 : 7, Hodson 1967 : 4, Anderson 1966 . In particular, suggestions such as the ones put forward by Paris (1998: 42) are questioned by the present paper; that a coherent analysis of Bible stories in economic terms had to be grounded in a "literalist" theological approach 6 , treating the Bible as a holy text that reflected the word of God.
Possibly more so than previous theologically grounded economic studies of Bible stories, which hang on to certain theological assumptions and prerogatives, an institutional economic reconstruction, as detailed in the following, enables a conceptually coherent and integrative analysis of Bible stories. Particular strengths of the institutional economic framework applied in this paper are its conciseness and conceptual coherence which may rival a theological interpretation (and a theologically grounded economic interpretation) of Bible stories. At times, sociological and theological analysis of religion have been criticized for ad hoc-theorizing, lacking theoretical coherence and integration, and being driven by rather random and arbitrary interpretations (Iannaccone 1995: 78) . The present paper suggests that metaphysical ideas can be reconceptualised by an institutional economics without the apriori postulation of certain pre-scientific concepts, deciphering and reconstructing them through the very methodic and theoretical elements that make up the institutional economic approach (See also Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming: Chapter 8). A metaphysical conceptualization of the idea of God and of God's role in resolving social conflict is probably only of interest to theology (and a behavioural, theologically grounded economics). However, such conceptualisations appear methodically and theoretically difficult to reconcile with a scientific research tradition (See also Hayek 1976: 170) -which would aim at conflict resolution through means of human intervention (in the case of economics, with incentive structures) but not by waiting for and relying on an omnipotent and omnipresent metaphysical entity to intervene as problem solver, as suggested by theology (e.g. Cohn 1981 : 1, Lace 1972 . Thus, an economic analysis of the Bible can enquire rather differently about the basic nature and purpose of the Bible.
In the following, first the admissibility of economic research on the Bible is briefly reviewed. Second, the key elements of an institutional economic approach are outlined.
Particular attention is paid to demarcating the methods of an (institutional) economics -'homo economicus' and 'dilemma structure' -from its elements of theory building and practical intervention -ideas like 'incentive structures', 'interactions over capital contributions and distributions', and the normative goal of mutuality of gains ('paretosuperiority'). Third, methodical, theoretical, and practical-normative elements of an institutional economics are traced in Genesis. The discussion analyzes how far economic versus non-economic concepts were drawn upon by Bible stories in their apparent analysis of the institutional problem.
Excursus: Is Social Science Research on the Bible 'Permitted'?
This paper examines how far Bible stories can be coherently and comprehensively brought under a scientific economic scheme of analysis. The approach subsequently followed is grounded in an economics of religion rather than a religious, theologically grounded economics. The latter followed in the footsteps of theology and tried to integrate economic analysis with theological concepts. For instance, it would view the idea of God as a given metaphysical concept which should be beyond an economic conceptualisation, as suggested
by Paris (1998: 42) . In contrast, an (institutional) economics of religion can attempt, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, to deconstruct and reconstruct metaphysical ideas. Such an economic interpretation might attract criticism from theology and a theologically-oriented economics (and here the more so from orthodox, literalist, theological researchers) since it rethinks basic prerogatives, assumptions, and conceptualizations of theology, for instance, the analytical nature and status of ideas like 'God', 'original sin', the 'wickedness of man', etc.
Looking at the impressive body of research in a sociology of religion (See Stolz 1974: 36) , the question regarding the permissibility of social science research on religion in general, and on the Bible in particular, may already seem to be answered. Still, there is a scarcity of economic research on the Bible and obvious difficulties exist between economists and theologians to understand each other's research -turmoil, even hooliganism is reported from one of the first conferences that was shared by theologians and economists (Brennan and Waterman 1994: 3-4) . Two methodically grounded arguments are discussed in the following in order to question ontologically grounded and morally grounded criticism of an economic reconstruction of Bible stories.
It is generally accepted that Bible stories need interpretation. Nevertheless, historically, theology has fought hard on ontological grounds to prevent sciences from interpreting its claimed subject matter. For instance, once physicists and biologists began to analyze the origin of the world and the origin of life in a way which was apparently incompatible with the way theology then interpreted biblical thought, scientists faced stern opposition and confrontation 7 . As helpful as an ontological understanding of scientific, philosophical, or theological research may be for illustrating simply what a research program is about, e.g. the fall of stones could be said to be the physicist's; markets could be said to be the economist's; role behaviour could be said to be the sociologist's; God could be said to be the theologist's, etc., it is probably just as unhelpful for understanding the basic nature of research. In one way or another, the various social sciences, philosophy, and theology all research the same subject matter. For instance, a phenomenon like marriage has been successfully conceptualized and analyzed in the terms of theology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, or economics. The same could be suggested with regard to the institutional problem. What seemingly distinguishes different research programs may not be different subject matter so much as different ways of looking at subject matter, reflecting methodic differences of "approach" (Becker 1993 (Becker : 385, 402, 1976 implied by Friedman 1953) . Such an understanding of research is in the first place methodically grounded rather than ontologically or phenomenologically. Leibniz and Kant pointed at such a methodic understanding of research early on, and the philosophy of science of Popper (1978) and Lakatos (1976) explained such an interpretation (Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming: Section 2.1, Suchanek 1994, Homann and Suchanek 1989: 72-73, 81; also Cassirer 1962: 4-5, 532-533) . On these grounds, findings from different research programs become compatible, i.e.
once they are transcended for methodical differences of approach. In this respect, an economic interpretation of Bible stories does not directly compete with theological research and theologically grounded economic research on the Bible, in particular a theological interpretation of God as an omnipresent and omnipotent personal God. To some extent, questions regarding the ontological status of the idea 'god' in biblical thought could even be said to be irrelevant to the present paper, which interprets the idea 'god' as a conceptual component of the text 'Bible'.
Criticism of an economic interpretation of the Bible might come from another direction, too: It has been claimed that economics were a "dismal", "dehumanized" science since it projected, so it is claimed, a negative image of human nature and of social life. Such claims are voiced at times even by renowned economists like Williamson (1985: 391) or Simon (1976: xxi) , or similarly Sen (1990: 25) . It can be suggested (Homann and Suchanek 1989: 75, 79, 84) (Homann 1990: 4-5; see also Iannaccone 1998 see also Iannaccone : 1465 . This suggestion is reinforced by the present paper by outlining that biblical stories can be reconstructed as a body of thought which examines -for moral reasons -problems in social behaviour in economic terms. A reconstruction of biblical thought in economic terms may also encourage a reevaluation of economics' status as a moral science.
The Institutional Economic Approach Outlined
The subsequent discussion outlines a simple vision of the institutional economic approach. A conceptual scheme of theoretical-(practical) elements and of methodic elements is drawn upon: As theoretical-(practical) elements are discussed the ideas 'incentive structures', 'social interactions over capital utilization', and 'pareto-superiority/-inferiority'; as methodic elements are discussed the ideas 'dilemma structure' and 'homo economicus'. A key issue in modelling interaction conflict is the conceptualization of interdependence amongst the choice behaviour of individual agents (For details see section 2.2. when the idea of the dilemma structure is discussed). A critical consideration here is that individuals participating in social exchange ultimately co-determine through their individual choices -unavoidably, intentionally or unintentionally -outcomes for each individual and for the group as a whole. It is especially the consideration of interdependence which makes the conceptualization and resolution of social conflict a non-trivial problem. Game theory discussed this issue in detail (Luce and Raiffa 1957, von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) .
A positive institutional economics analyzes succeeding/failing cooperation in relation to existing incentive structures. Such analysis is subsequently transcended in practical-normative perspective. Insights from positive analysis are used to treat the institutional problem as a systemic, situational condition, namely in relation to the (re)-design of incentive structures 9 -the 'rules of the game' or 'rules structures' or 'governance structures' -in order to encourage cooperation (if desired 10 ). The studies of Homann (1997 Homann ( : 16-17, 23, 1990 , Buchanan (1995 Buchanan ( : 142, 146-7, 1987a Buchanan ( : 21-32, 51-63, 1987b , Williamson (1985: 28-29, 33-34, 72-79) provide details on this issue. Stigler and Becker (1977: 76) and early on von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947: 44, 49) hinted at this issue, too.
Successful interactions are analyzed in this way as a reflection of incentive-compatible incentive structures, which realign and "equilibrate" (Williamson 1998: 34, 76 ) individual (self)-interests of interacting choice makers so that mutuality of gains results as interaction outcome. Equally, unresolved conflict and a break-down of cooperation is analyzed as a problem of incentive-incompatible organisation structures, which do not realign interests of (potentially merely) self-interested agents and thus yield mutual loss as interaction outcome, or "rational foolishness", as Sen (1990: 35- 
Key Methodic Ideas of an Institutional Economic Reconstruction
Methodically, an institutional economics is organized, like any research program, by heuristic tools: in this case, the ideas of the dilemma structure and the homo economicus. They can be viewed as the methodic motor of institutional economics, and probably of economics in general. The dilemma structure reflects economics' model of social interactions. It suggests that interacting choice makers have both common interests -namely to cooperate in order to improve their individual welfare positions -, and conflicting ones -to organize capital contributions to and distributions from an interaction to one's own advantage and to the disadvantage of other agents (Homann 1999 : 125-128, 1994 : 396-402, 1990 : 13, Buchanan 1995 : 144-148, Tullock 1985 more incompletely, also Hayek 1976 : 79, 1960 : 270, Popper 1957 . In game theoretical terms, the idea of the dilemma structure models a breakdown of cooperation in a non-zero-sum game, that means all choice makers lose because of non-cooperation -despite the possibility that all choice makers could gain if cooperation succeeded. Williamson (1985: 62-76, 85; also Williamson 1975: 135-6) speaks of the "contracting dilemma", or similarly, Buchanan (1975: 136-42 ) of the punishment dilemma (Similarly Buchanan 1995 : 142-7, 1987b . As Williamson (1996: 137) summed For a normative institutional economics the important implication is here that only if dilemmatic conflicts over capital contributions to and distributions from social exchange can be resolved, can a common interest in achieving gains from cooperation be realized.
Otherwise, all interacting choice makers are driven by a 'defective' incentive logic to behave as 'rational fools', which means each individual's (self)-interests are damaged because of selfinterested choice in the face of certain, given incentive structures. Thus, 'rational foolishness' is analytically not attributed to institutions of a different kind, such as defective social values, a deficit in religious predispositions, immoral attitudes, etc., which could be behaviourally handled, for instance, through institutional regulatives such as religiosity and practices of religion (See also Wagner-Tsukamoto 2001). At times, even economists seem to (mis)-interpret 'rational foolishness in a non-situational, non-systemic, non-economic, but behaviourial way, e.g. Sen (1990: 30-1, 35-7) and similarly Margolis (1982) , Etzioni (1988) , and, in degrees, even Williamson (1998 Williamson ( : 2, 15-17, 1985 . Importantly, the dilemma structure models an interaction scenario in which cooperation breaks down because of rational self-interested choice, which is modelled through the homo economicus. Compared to the idea of the dilemma structure, the homo economicus is a derivative heuristic of (institutional) economics, supporting and complementing the application of the idea of the dilemma structure. As with the idea of the dilemma structure, the analytical significance and relevance of the homo economicus for (institutional) economic analysis rests strictly on its methodic application (together with the dilemma structure) for analysing, in theoretical perspective, and for improving, in practical perspective, incentive structures and capital exchange. In an empirical-behaviourial sense, the homo economicus is abstracted from human nature (Iannaccone 1995 : 77, Homann 1994 : 387-92, 395-6, 1990 : 9-13, Becker 1993 , Suchanek 1993 ). Hayek's (1949) concept of "methodological individualism" hinted at this early on.
A critical issue in understanding why economics applies the methods 'dilemma structure' and 'homo economicus' is the question of the purpose of economic analysis -or problem dependence (Homann 1994 , 1990 , Suchanek 1994 , Homann and Suchanek 1989 , Popper 1978 , Lakatos 1976 ; see also above). The ideas 'dilemma structure' and 'homo economicus' have to be strictly understood as methods: tools or "heuristics" in Lakatos' terminology, for analyzing and solving the institutional problem in economic terms, with regard to the (re)-design of incentive structures for improving the pareto-effectiveness of capital exchange. The key insight the dilemma structure and the homo economicus heuristically enable is that non-cooperation "... is inherent in the situation" (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 97) , which means in incentive structures that did not realign self-interests of interacting decision-makers. Such a purpose compares to the purpose of Hobbes' concept of the "war of all". He supposedly used this idea in a heuristic sense, too (Homann 1990: 9, 13 , also
Wagner-Tsukamoto 2001, Buchanan 1987a).
A car crash analogy neatly illustrates this point (See Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming, 2001). Like the 'car crash dummy', the homo economicus may not reflect an empirically too realistic portrayal of human nature. So, in terms of the car crash analogy, the dilemma structure can be interpreted as the car crash setting in which an accident is simulated. In real life, car crash dummies are never seen driving cars on roads. But despite being empirically rare, and despite its empirical incorrectness regarding the portrayal of "real people" or "human nature as we know it", to use a key phrase to which behaviourial (institutional) economists, e.g. Williamson (1998 Williamson ( : 2, 1985 , North (1993a: 14) , Sen (1990: 30-1, 35-7) , Coase (1984: 231) , Simon (1976: xxi) , Knight (1948: 270) , claim to subscribe, the crash dummy seems to be rather useful for purposes of car design (but not for improving the driving behaviour of car drivers; this would reflect a different project of social engineering).
As the car crash dummy loses its purpose and relevance when separated from the crash test, so the homo economicus does when separated from the dilemma structure and the situational analysis of interaction problems over capital utilization in relation to incentive structures. For the purpose of a theology, an organization psychology, an institutional sociology, or a behaviourial moral philosophy, ideas like the homo economicus and the dilemma structure may be unfruitful and irrelevant research heuristics (See Figure 3) . On grounds of problem dependence, they may have to be rejected for this kind of research -but not on grounds of being an 'unrealistic' or 'immoral' image of man and world view as implied by some economists and many other social scientists. It is because of its heuristic grounding in the idea of the homo economicus and of the dilemma structure that an economics in the tradition of Mandeville and Smith, as probably most coherently picked up in the 20th century by economists of the likes of Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, Becker, and Homann, can make considerable moral claims since these heuristics enable the resolution of the institutional problem to the advantage of all choice makers (in more detail, Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming: Sections 2.5, 7.1. and 8.1).
An Institutional Economic Reconstruction of Genesis
The following examines whether and how far the stories of Genesis address the institutional problem in economic terms. The reconstruction proceeds in three steps, tracing in section 3.1.
the idea of capital contribution-distribution conflicts and of mutual gains (pareto-superiority) as goals of conflict resolution; examining in section 3.2. the methodic modelling of capital contribution-distribution conflicts through the ideas of the dilemma structure and the homo economicus; and finally, assessing in section 3.3. Genesis' approach to resolving social conflict through institutional ordering via the (re)-design of incentive structures as compared with institutional ordering via the behavioural intervention with value structures. Figure 1 provides a 'road map' for this discussion.
Biblical Capital Contribution-Distribution Conflicts and Pareto-superiority as Desired Outcome of Conflict Resolution: In Search of the Genesis of Wealth for a

Community of Nations
In general, Genesis appears not reluctant to analyze social problems through economic concepts of capital utilization and wealth creation. In nearly all biblical stories issues of scarcity regarding certain types of capital, as reflected by capital constraints on choice behaviour, set the scene for cooperation problems. Gordon (1994 Gordon ( : 20-1, 1989 discussed the interest of the Old Testament in issues of scarcity (which is seemingly overlooked by Paris' 1998 : 51 assessment of Gordon's studies). Gordon's analysis of scarcity focused on scarce free time 12 enjoyed by Adam & Eve in paradise ('six days work/one day off'). The present paper extends such an analysis of scarcity in time capital to other types of capital and, more importantly, projects issues of scarcity on interaction questions of how to handle capital scarcities and the contribution-distribution conflicts it is likely to induce in an interaction.
Ideas of capital and capital utilization can be found in many Bible stories:
 Time capital in terms of "free time" (Gordon 1994 (Gordon : 20-1, 1989 but also in terms of "life time" and "eternal life" (Genesis 2: 9, 3: 22, 6: 3).
 Site capital and physical capital in fertile land, drinking water, animals, and plants ( Genesis 1: 26, 30, 26: 12, [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] 27: 28 Jacob, Laban and Jacob, Joseph and the pharaoh of Egypt. These stories have in common that cooperation problems -or the 'institutional problem' -are discussed as interaction problems among a mere handful of persons. Such a scenario in which only a small number of persons interact compares to the analytical approach of the theories which form the conceptual backbone of an institutional economics, namely game theory, property rights theory, principal-agent theory, and a transaction cost economics. Besides enabling a detailed discussion of interaction problems, a small numbers focus analytically reflects that only in an interaction context with a finite number of agents can social conflict, which is caused by interdependent choice behaviours, arise (In detail Homann 1999; also Williamson 1985 Williamson , 1975 Luce and Raiffa 1957; von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) . Conceptually and practically, however, the Bible, like a constitutional and institutional economics, is seemingly not interested in cooperation problems among a mere handful of people. Bible stories typically examine the resolution of interaction problems amongst tribes or nations -which are personified through their leaders.
Interaction problems in the "city" (Genesis 11 : 4, 22: 18, 44: 3) , the "nation" (Genesis Figure 3 ), but the creation of wealth for all choice makers (Genesis 14:11,17-24), in a sense of 'economic peace' or 'industrial peace'. Normative ideals like the wealth of a city (Genesis 11: 4, 22: 18) , the wealth of a nation (Genesis 10: 1-32, 12: 2, 18: 18, 27: 29) , and even the wealth of a community of nations (Genesis 35: 11, also Genesis 18: 18, 22: 18) strongly hint at such an economic rationale for handling the institutional problem. with value pluralism, with even value decay prevailing, and (2) a (documented) attempt was made to advise through the stories of the Bible on cooperation problems. As section 3.3.
details, in the face of rising value pluralism, the Bible seemed to favour economic ordering via incentive structures over behaviourial ordering via value structures, such as religious belief systems. also poignantly referred to. Such constraints on choice behaviour in paradise regarding fruits from certain trees were not identified by Gordon's (1994 Gordon's ( , 1989 and Paris' (1998) The key purpose of modelling defection in paradise and of invoking the idea of the original sin can be suggested to be a heuristic one: the original sin methodically instructing the analysis of the possibility of defection in capital exchange, the possibility of a "war about goods", as Genesis (14: 2, 11, 16) later details. Through the idea of the "fallen condition of man" and a "continuous struggle" (Gordon 1989: 1, 3) , social exchange could be simulated by the Bible as a potentially conflict-laden interaction over capital contributions and distributions. The prospect of "... if war breaks out ..." (Exodus 1: 10, emphasis added) could be analysed in this way. Thus, like Hobbes' idea of the war of all, or more abstractly, the concept of the dilemma structure in institutional economic analysis, the idea of the original sin may reflect a methodic instrument of the Bible for raising and analyzing the institutional problem. Such an instrumental interpretation of the original sin differs from an empirical-behavioural one, as theology (e.g. Tullock 1981 : 42-3, Otzen 1980 and also a behavioural, theologically grounded economics suggest (e.g. Gordon 1994 Gordon , 1989 , also Paris 1998).
A Methodic Interpretation of Defection in
A non-behavioural, methodic answer to the question of why the Bible invoked the idea of the original sin is supported by the way Genesis (and the other books of the Bible)
sequenced and extended an analysis of contribution-distribution problems, when at times the idea of the dilemma structure is explicitly touched upon (1) "opportunistic" and "self-seeking with guile", as Williamson (1998 Williamson ( : 1, 1985 Williamson ( : 6, 30-32, 64-67, 1975 
Institutional Regulative
At least in some of the early stories, Genesis seemed to aim theoretically and practically at value contracting in order to handle the institutional problem, namely when it invoked a "covenant" even an "everlasting covenant" (Genesis 9: 8, 12, 19, 17: 7, 19, 22: 18) between God and man, which was grounded in man's faith in God (See Spriggs 1974:4) .
Through stories which depicted role models of highly religious men, nearly 'holy man', the Bible indicated how man should aim to live in the image of God, adhering to social values such as righteousness, justice, non-violence (Genesis 4: 7, (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 22, 9: 6, 20: 6, 22: 15) .
Key role models discussed in this respect were Noah, "a righteous, blameless man" (Genesis 6: 9), and Abraham, a "right and just man" (Genesis 18: 19) . The resolution of social problems was thus approached in a behavioural manner, being made dependent on the clear conscience of the individual, as reflected by the religiosity of man and his personal mastery of living in the image of God. The Bible's approach compares in this respect to a social psychology 24 , and similarly to a behaviourial ethics, e.g. a virtue ethics, which suggests that through the "...
[behavioural] regulation of the individual soul ..." (Plato 1999: 174) , namely by leading a godly life, the institutional problem can be solved, in Plato's words, the "... good and true city and state ..." can be achieved (Plato 1999: 174) .
But even when the Bible seemingly favoured such a behaviourial route to institutional analysis it still backed up conflict resolution with certain methods and concepts of economics. This is reflected by the type of interaction outcome that was discussed for value contracting:
not peace or harmony in social relations as such but the generation of wealth for all choice makers. Even the good religious man received ample capital distributions from social interactions: for living in the image of God, Noah and Abraham and their families (their 'nations') were rewarded with fruitful land, prosperity, longevity, and surviving disasters (See also section 3.1. above) 25 . From the very beginning, Genesis signalled such an economic framework for behavioural contracting when man's living in the image of God was interlinked with "ruling" over capital: "God said: 'Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground." (Genesis 1: 26) The question of how to effectively "rule" over capital was answered by Genesis with the recommendation of value contracting with God: faith in God and living a life in the image of God. Genesis seemed to propose here that, in line with man approximating an image of God, an institutional regulative could be enacted for organizing successful capital utilization. In this respect, Genesis' positive suggestions on man being created in the image of God may have to be normatively interpreted in the first place.
It seems quite clear that Genesis was not written as a pure behaviourial ethics: at least it aimed at a "behaviourial economics", questions of value contracting between God and man being tied to issues of effective capital utilisation and economic rewards. The Bible apparently viewed religiosity and value contracting as means for effective capital utilisation.
The subsequent discussion details whether and, if so, how far Genesis qualified such an approach. It is suggested that Genesis set out proposals on 'truly' economic institutional ordering, favouring economic ordering over value contracting. The subsequent discussion proposes that such a switch in perspective can be explained with respect to a superior capability of economic institutions to handle cooperation problems for certain interaction contexts, namely modern ones (See section 3.3.2).
Genesis' Exit From a Behavioural-Theological Economics: The Birth of Israel and the Favouring of Economic Ordering as Mechanism for Institutional Regulation
Effectiveness and efficiency limits of behavioural ordering are likely to be reached in certain interaction contexts, namely when the condition of modernity is encountered, which means when value pluralism 26 , or negatively formulated, a lacking value consensus and even value decay, characterize social interactions 27 . In social arenas such as the city, the nation state, and the more so a community of nations, value contracting and the maintenance of a value consensus may become too difficult and too expensive (Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming:
Chapter 1 and 8, 2001 , also MacIntyre 1985 : 1-5, Hardin 1968 : 1246 . Possibly the Bible initially entered only a behavioural ethics (supported by a behaviourial economics) in order to qualify such an approach in relation to the condition of modernity. The fragility of value contracting was already hinted at in the garden of Eden story, but the more so through various family-type interaction scenarios (Cain-Abel, Jacob-Esau, Jacob-Isaac, Joseph-his brothers, etc.) in which value contracting normally would be expected to succeed (or at least be more cost-effective than economic ordering) 28 -but still failed.
In contrast to behavioural ordering via an intrinsically enacted value consensus, a ('conventional': 'non-behaviourial', 'situational') economics analyzes interaction problems as problems of pareto-effective capital utilization in relation to economic institutions, namely incentive structures of one form or another. The advantage of such an approach is that it can solve the institutional problem while tolerating the condition of modernity at the same time.
As it emerged in force from Buchanan's studies and more implicitly also from Williamson's, interaction problems over capital contributions and distributions -the potential "war about goods" in the Bible's terminology -can probably be more successfully handled in this way, both theoretically and practically. The condition of modernity was thematically invoked by the Bible through the tower of Babel story (chapter 11); through the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (chapter 19) and, probably most importantly, through the stories of Jacob struggling with Esau, Laban, and God, and Jacob being subsequently re-born as "Israel" 29 . Genesis began to discuss in detail the limits of a behavioural ethics to handle social conflict under the condition of modernity through the story of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. In this story, a value consensus had broken down and value decay was emerging.
In this situation, behavioural institutional intervention could only resort to an apocalyptic, religious fundamentalist approach to 'solve' the institutional problem -by raining "... down burning sulphur" (Genesis 19: 23) on Sodom and Gomorrah which wiped out these cities 30 .
Such conflict 'resolution' reflects the theoretical and practical exhaustion of behaviourial institutional analysis when the condition of modernity is encountered (See also WagnerTsukamoto 2001). The Bible seemed to be very much aware of such shortcomings of a behavioural ethics to solve the institutional problem constructively. This is reflected by how
Genesis developed a discussion of the institutional problem after the Sodom and Gomorrah incident. Especially in the stories of Jacob's struggle with Esau, Laban, and God (as discussed in the following), and in the in-depth 'case study' of the epic struggle over 'industrial justice' between Egypt and its expatriate Israelite work force (See Wagner-Tsukamoto 2000a), the Bible seemingly sought a conceptual re-orientation which enabled a constructive resolution of social conflict under tolerance of value pluralism or even value decay.
Genesis (chapters 30-31) depicts Jacob as being inclined towards deceitfulness and cheating. He is modelled as a choice maker who is not instinctively pre-disposed towards cooperation in social interactions (as earlier invoked by Genesis through the figures of Abraham and Noah). Jacob's behaviour closely reflected the homo economicus. He knew how to bend and interpret a contract to his advantage without breaking it. For instance, exploiting an emergency situation when his elder brother was close to starving, Jacob "enticed" Esau to sell his birth right to him (Miller 1994:759) . Later, again under awkward circumstances, Jacob extracted from his father Isaac an agreement which allowed him to 'cash' in the rights which he had 'bought' from Esau. Jacob's knowledge of haggling tactics, of "perfunctory cooperation" or "organizational misbehaviour", as Williamson (1985 Williamson ( : 262-3, 1975 or Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 1-3, 25 ) might call it, becomes the more apparent in interactions with his employer Laban. A classic contribution-distribution conflict, reflecting the commons dilemma, is told here by 26, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
Besides the payment of a fixed wage by Laban to Jacob, Jacob and Laban agreed to share capital gains from farm production: their contract detailed that Jacob was allowed to keep all newly bred speckled and spotted sheep and goats of Laban's herd. However, since Jacob was the shepherd and thus the producer of livestock capital he could influence through clever breeding tactics the number of spotted and speckled animals. The agreement between Jacob and Laban did not explicitly forbid Jacob to follow such tactics. A problem of so-called "incomplete, relational contracting" existed, as Williamson (1985: 71-79) 21: 22-31, 26: 19-23) , settled a dispute on the use of water through the design of incentive structures: a rule -here a sworn oath, a "promise" -on how the dispute was to be settled, and a sanction -here: a payment of seven lambs by Abraham to Abimelech -to sanction the rule. Not through a behavioural value contract via God as contracting host but through incentive structures, (re)-designed by man through "private ordering" and "governance", to use Williamson's (1985: 9-10, 28-29, 33-34, 72-79) Williamson. In relation to invoking the condition of modernity, of value pluralism, even of value decay, the Bible seemed to carefully resist calling upon God, understood in a behavioural institutional sense, to solve cooperation problems, apparently realizing that in social arenas like the city, the nation, and the international community, theologicalpsychological ordering reflected a pareto-inferior strategy for conflict resolution. Then Genesis no longer advocated behaviourial techniques like value education, or even "value indoctrination" and "social conditioning" as behaviourial economists suggest (e.g. Sen 1990 : 36, Simon 1976 also Etzioni 1988; in degrees even Williamson 1998: 15-17 The article also hinted that the question can be raised regarding how far JudeoChristian religion is grounded in a capitalist ethics. Such an examination complements, possibly in degrees even revises, Max Weber's analysis of a religious ethic of capitalism.
Related, the spread of certain religions as world religions can be explored in economic terms.
Admittedly, this paper focused on the big questions of an economic deciphering and reconstruction of the Bible. Future research has to deepen the lines of analysis that were marked out. An in-depth economic reconstruction of individual stories of the Bible as well as an in-depth tracing of different conceptual ideas appears promising, such as the Bible's analysis of scarcity and the relationship of scarcity to the condition of modernity; biblical suggestions on the derivation of property rights; the role of contractarianism in biblical thought, especially incomplete, relational contracting; the economics of biblical law-making, law enforcement, and jurisdiction; the self-elimination, adverse selection dynamics of religiosity when encountering a "Jacob"; types of contractual and non-contractual economic institutions conceptualized in the Bible; fiscal policy in biblical thought; etc. For the purpose of such analyses, the scene seems to be set conceptually by an institutional economics which recognizes methodic and theoretical differences in comparison to theology, and similarly, to a behavioural, theologically grounded economics. An institutional economics, understood in this way, conducts positive analysis with a view to normative analysis, namely the (re)-design of incentive structures in order to solve capital contribution-distribution conflicts to the mutual advantage of interacting parties (or differently put, the genesis of the wealth of nations), thus preventing a potential "war about goods" as Genesis invoked in a Hobbesian tradition.
that the Old Testament reflects the words of an omnipotent and omnipresent personal God. As much as the present paper and source-critical theological research approach questions of authorship similarly, an economic interpretation of biblical thought as developed in this paper still differs considerably from a source-critical theology, namely with regard to the methodical and theoreticalpractical interpretation of the substance of biblical thought. 7 Over time theology seems to have at least implicitly acknowledged that such ontological claims made to and derived from the Bible are untenable. This is reflected by its acceptance that physical or biological theories, e.g. on the origin of the world or the evolution of life, are compatible with the Bible (although it could be suggested, as implied by the present paper, that the Bible is not predominantly interested in physical and biological research problems).
8 Based on the positive-theoretical analysis of social problems, an institutional economics, like economics in general, advises practitioners like managers or politicians on institutional ordering and the design of institutional structures. Economics from the studies of Mill, Bentham, Pareto to the studies of Knight, Hayek, Buchanan, North or Williamson have always had such a strong practicalnormative orientation. As Popper (1957: 56) noted by referring to Hayek: "Economic analysis has never been the product of detached intellectual curiosity about the why of social phenomena, but of an intense urge to reconstruct a world which gives rise to profound dissatisfaction." (See also Williamson 1998 : 1-2, Homann 1997 : 16-17, 23, Muller 1993 : 1-2, North 1993b : 253-5, Becker 1993 : 402, Buchanan 1987b . 9 The idea of the institution is here interpreted as incentive structures. Section 3.3. has further details.
10 Indeed, in the simple example of the prisoners' dilemma, as discussed in section 2.2, noncooperation among the prisoners is desired by society. Incentive structures are here deliberately set up to make the prisoners behave as 'rational fools'. This implies that a normative institutional economics can aim at inducing cooperation but also non-cooperation -depending on what is viewed as socially desirable. The concept of competition in a market economy be interpreted similarly, which, if properly enacted, forces individual firms to behave as non-cooperative 'rational fools'-for the larger good of society (See also Wagner-Tsukamoto 2001).
11 In this respect, a key advantage of an economic approach over a behavioural approach to handling cooperation problems is that it can tolerate value pluralism, even value decay in social interactions, and can still induce socially desirable interaction outcomes. Thus, it conceptually and practically accommodates the "condition of modernity" (value pluralism, value decay) without having to overcome it in order to solve the institutional problem (For details, see Wagner-Tsukamoto 2000a , 2001 ; see also section 3.3. below).
12 Becker (1965) would speak of "time capital". 13 Smith discussed as an ordering mechanism the "invisible hand", i.e. the incentive structure "price mechanism", although he proceeded in a more governance-oriented contractarian, institutional economic tradition in chapter 6 on the Treaties of Commerce amongst nations (Smith 1976 ).
14 Indeed, regarding its linguistic roots, the word 'paradise' is of Persian origin. Fascinating in this respect is Otzen's (1980) comparison of the garden of Eden story to Babylonian narratives, such as the Gilgamosh epic (See also Tullock 1981: 43-4) . 15 However, how far religious belief systems can possibly solve interaction conflicts of agents who subscribe to different sets of religious belief (value pluralism!) has to be examined critically (See section 3.3).
16 Otzen (1980: 45) tends to imply wrongly that man was prevented from achieving eternal life as a result of being driven out of paradise. As discussed above, already in paradise man was forbidden to eat from the tree of eternal life: this constraint on Adam & Eve's choice behaviour effective contract execution, as elaborated on in an institutional economics (Williamson 1985: 169-175 ). Miller's (1993b) interpretation of Bible stories with regard to a sacrifice model can be linked in this way to institutional economic analysis. Raskovich's (1996: 462) analysis of religious services in biblical times through a franchise model is instructive here, too.
26 "Liberty", as Mill might call it. Questions regarding the quality of morality of a behaviourial ethics as compared with an economic approach to ethics can be raised here, too (See WagnerTsukamoto 2001) . 27 The historic-economic environment in which the Bible emerged and the social conflicts it reflected probably closely mirrored problems of value pluralism (Briefly hinted at above in section 3.1). A crucial biblical example here is the inter-national, multi-cultural interaction scenario discussed in the story of Israel in Egypt (See Wagner-Tsukamoto 2000a).
28 Seemingly, the Bible was rather critical regarding family bonds being an effective institutional (behavioural) regulative, as reflected by the interaction problems depicted through family feuds.
29 Also, the stories involving Joseph, as well as Moses, have to be considered here when the role of the condition of modernity in biblical thinking is discussed (See Wagner-Tsukamoto 2000a).
30 Plato (1999 Plato ( : 1317 rather similarly suggested protectionism, the banning of international travelling, and even a "war for values" as means to ensure the effectiveness of value contracting as an institutional behavioural regulative. For a behavioural ethics, such as a virtue ethics and a religious ethics, some rather grim moral implications emerge from such suggestions (See Wagner-Tsukamoto forthcoming: Chapter 8, 2001) . 31 In the story of God fighting with Jacob, Genesis hinted at value pluralism and the condition of modernity by explicitly locating the fight "... within sight of the city" (Genesis 33: 18) -with the "city" being a key reference to value pluralism, even value decay, at least since Genesis' discussion of the Sodom and Gomorrah incident. 32 Figure 4 captures hypotheses which future research has to spell out further and examine in detail. 33 In certain isolated instances, such a pre-modern context may have survived even in industrial societies as, for example, illustrated by the Amish people in the USA. 34 With lessons learnt from discourses with natural sciences over the past centuries, theology may possibly be prepared to engage more openly in such discourses with social sciences.
